COMMENTS
THE OBLIGATION OF A HIGH-LEVEL EMPLOYEE TO HIS
FORMER EMPLOYER: THE STA.VDARD BRANDS CASE
In the context of the modem corporate world, the lack of human perfection
has necessitated the development of judicial' and legislative 2 standards of
beha- ior which impose upon an employee-fiduciary "the duty of so disciplining [his] acquisitive impulses that they will operate vicariously so as to increase to the maximum extent possible not [his] own acquisitions but those of
[his] emplo.er.'S This fiduciary duty is not a concept taken lightly by the
courts. 4 This comment. howe' er, is not concerned with the fiduciary relationship in general. Rather it deals with the scope of permissible behavior of a
high-le'el or executive employee when he formulates plans to compete with
his employer prior to the termination of his employment relationship.
While the courts often speak of the duties of such an employee in terms of
the fiduciary requirements of a corporate director or business partner,S there
is probably a valid distinction between cases involving these two classes of
fiduciaries. A suit for unfair competition against a former employee will
usually be concerned with acts leading up to a sharp break with the employer,
coupled with the formation of a separate competing enterprise. A suit against
a director for breach of fiduciary duty will usually be concerned with his
I "The policy of the law is to put fiduciaries beyond the reach of temptation by making
it unprofitable for them to yield to it." Hoyte v. Hampe, 206 Iowa 206, 220, 214 N.W. 718,
724-25 (1927).
2 See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 98, §§ 234-35, 237-45 (1935).
3 Dodd, Is Effectire Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable? 2 U. CHI. L. REv. 194, 195 (1935).
4 "[An agent is subject to a duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his agency." 2 REsrATEzr (SEco.,,n), AGE.4cy § 387
(1957). **[The] relationship ... was one in which the most perfect good faith was required,
-a relationship uI'errimafides."Hunter v. Shell Oil Co., 198 F.2d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 1952);
"'its paramount and %ital principle is good faith; without it the relationship of principal and
agent cannot exist; and so sedulously is this principle guarded, that all departures from it
are esteemed frauds upon the confidence bestowed." Keighler v. Savage Mfg. Co., 12 Md.
383,416 (1858); accord,Nagel v. Todd. 185 Md. 512, 517, 45 A.2d 326, 328 (1946); see Guth
v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 268-83, 5 A.2d 503, 509-15 (1939); cf. State ex rel. Harris v
Gautier, 108 Fla. 390, 147 So. 240 (1933); Bank of California v. Hoffman, 255 Wis. 165,
171, 30 N.W.2d 506, 509 (1949); see generally LArry, I.'RoOucrnoN TO BusIrNss AssocmTioNs; 381-83 (1951); 1 MECHEM, AGEN;CY §§'1188-1239 (2d. ed. 1914); TU-FANY, AGENCY
§§ 142-47 (2d ed. Powell 1924); Ballantine, Morbid Morality: A Standardfor Galahador
"Reasonable Men"? 38 A.B.A.J. 298 (1952); Dodd, supra note 3; Evans, fiduciary Obligations ofAgents, 2 W. REs. L. Rev. 5 (1950); Note, 54 HARv. L. REv. 1191 (1941).
5 See, e.g., Hunter v. Shell Oil Co., supra note 4.
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usurpation of a corporate opportunity while the relationship is still maintained with the principal. 6 This seemingly insignificant difference is actually
quite important in that an employee, even one high in a corporate hierachy,
is for the most part dependent on his employment for his means of subsistence.
This is not likely to be the case with a director, where the income, if any, from
the directorship is probably ancillary to the individual's main source of remuneration. Consequently, the holding of an employee to the fiduciary level
of a director is likely to result in considerable financial hardship, particularly
if he is enjoined from competing with his former employer.7
Similarly, cases involving high-level employees can be distinguished from
those involving employees in the lower levels of a corporate or business
hierarchy.8 The main difference is that since "varying degrees [of] trust and
confidence are reposed, and are expected to be reposed, in the representative," 9
it would seem logical that the degree of trust and confidence will vary with the
position of the individual. Hence, a non-executive employee will usually be
held to a lower standard than is an executive employee, just as an executive
employee will usually be held to a lower standard than is a director. 10
Two cases in which there has been judicial concern with the conduct of
high-level employees in regard to competitive preparations are Standard
Brands, Inc. v. United States PartitionCorp." and DuaneJones Co. v. Burke.12
These two cases appear to be illustrative of the relatively few decisions in this
area. Since they involve varied and intricate factual situations, the two cases
tend to exemplify the range of problems that can arise.13 It must, however, be
remembered that there are likely to be special problems and developments
within a particular jurisdiction.14
In the recent StandardBrands case, particular attention was directed to the
effect of the employee's competitive preparations on the intangible corporate
6 See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255,5 A.2d 503 (1939); Meinhard v. Salmon, 249
N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
7An injunction is the form of relief usually sought in these cases. See 2 RESTATEmENT
(SEcoND), AGENCY § 399, comment on clause (f) at 233 (1957); see also McClain, Injunctive
Relief Against Employees Using ConfidentialInformation, 23 Ky. L. J. 248 (1935). See note

68 infra.
8
These cases will be discussed more thoroughly infra note 50.
9LAry,op. cit. supra note 4, at 381. (Emphasis added.)
10See text accompanying note 7 supra.
11 130 U.S.P.Q. 258 (E.D. Wis. 1961).

12 281 App. Div. 662, 121 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1953), aff'd as modified, 306 N.Y. 172, 117
N.E.2d 237 (1954).

13 For other cases of a similar nature see note 43 infra.
14 For a particularly cogent discussion of the status of the law in California, see Hays,
The CaliforniaLaw of Unfair Competition Takes a Turn-Againstthe Employer, 41 CAIF. L.
REv. 38 (1953). See also McClain, supranote 7; Note, Protectionof CustomerLists in New
York, 1 Svn.cusE L. REv. 110 (1949).
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asset of good will.15 In the actual litigation the plaintiff brought an action for
unfair competition against four former employees and the corporation which
they had organized.16 One of the several allegations against the former key
personnel17 was that they had "usurped the good will of [Standard Brands']
customers."18 It was contended that eight months prior to the simultaneous
resignation of the three top executives, they had conspired to enter into competition with their then employer, using the corporate defendant as a vehicle
for this purpose. With this conspiracy always in mind, they continued to entertain Standard Brands' customers, at considerable expense to the plaintiff, in
the hope that "the gifts and entertainment would result in an attitude of good
will in the part of the recipient towards [the individual defendants]." 19 The
plaintiff, therefore, unwittingly financed competition as it naively assumed
that the good will flowing from its largess would inure to its own benefit rather
than to its employees. Essentially the plaintiff here was contending that the
most effective way the corporate entity could develop good will was through
the rapport between the defendants, as its representatives, and Standard Brands'
customers; and that, since the plaintiff was using the defendants in a manner
without the scope of ordinary executive activities, their skills as "gracious
hosts" became "personnel assets" of the employer and hence were deserving
of judicial protection from abuse.20 The defendants also copied the plaintiff's
blueprints of the machinery necessary for the production of the partitions,
thus enabling the corporate defendant to get into production faster at lower
costs. Furthermore, they used plaintiff's staff for their own personal benefit
while still employed by the plaintiff, and thence proceeded to ask plaintiff's
staff to join U.S. Partition when its operations commenced. These acts, especially the attempt to usurp plaintiff's good will, drastically reduced the gross
15 "Good

will is not a fixed concept, uniformly understood in the same sense in every

type of business. It may relate to a business apart from the personality or reputation of its
management or individual owner.... A business enjoys various types of good will depending upon the different spheres within which its reputation is established. Good will refers to
the business as it is viewed by others." 1 CALLmAws
, UNrAux Compnnmm AD Txn
MAiss § 2.2 at 21 (1945); see generally Note, An Inquiry Into the Nature of Goodwill, 53
COLUIS. L REv. 660 (1953).
16 The four defendants had been employees of plaintiff's unincorporated division, American Partition Company. The corporate defendant was formed to compete with Amercan "in
the business of manufacturing and selling chipboard partitions and other paper product
partitions for cases, boxes and containers." 130 U.S.P.Q. at 259.
17 The four defendants had been the president-general manager, vice president in charge
of production vice president in charge of sales, and toolroom foreman of American.
Is 130 US.P.Q. at 261.
19 Id. at 265.

20 'TlJhe responsibility of the fiduciary is not limited to a properregardfor the tangible
balance sheet assets of the corporation,but includes the dedication of his uncorrupted busi-

ness judgment for the sole benefit of the corporation...
173, 176 (2d. Cir. 1955). (Emphasis added.)

."

Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d
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sales of this particular division of Standards Brands. 2' The plaintiff requested
that the defendants be enjoined from using the duplicated machinery or the
parts thereof, and that there be an accounting for profits and general
22
damages.
In upholding plaintiff's contention that the continuance of the entertaining,
after the formulation of the competitive plans, constituted unfair competition,
the court said:
Defendant owed a duty of disclosure after they had formulated their plans
to prepare for engaging in competition. It is not disputed that some customer good will adhered to the immediate dispensers of American's
bounty, as shown by the effusive letters of gratitude from the recipients.
These activities were wrongful because defendants had not informed
American or Standard Brands of their plans to engage in a competitive
enterprise and of the steps already undertaken in the accomplishment of
their objective. Had plaintiff known of defendants' competitive plans prior
to the undertaking of these promotional activities, it would have a choice
as to the wisdom of expending considerable sums of money under the
2
circumstances. 3
It is well settled law that (1) a fiduciary is under a duty to disclose to his

employer any information, concerning the agency, which the employer would

be likely to want to know,24 and (2) a fiduciary is under a duty, even after
21 Ile average sales revenue dropped from $662,400 in 1954-1956, to an average revenue
of $40,000 in 1957-1960. 130 U.S.P.Q. at 265.
This division, American Partition Company, was not formed by Standard Brands, but
rather had existed in various corporate forms prior to being purchased by the plaintiff. The
individual defendants had been employed by American before the consumation of the sale.
In letters to plaintiff's customers, written after the termination of their employment, in
which they earnestly solicited the customer's patronage, the defendants attempted to justify
their behavior with the following explanation:
"Briefly, the reason for the above individuals severing their relations was due to the fact
that since Standard Brands acquired American Partition Company, during a period of 16
months of ownership they never once demonstrated or manifested any interest in the human
element. There was never any concern or discussions related to the welfare or future of the
personnel, individually or collectively. On this basis of day to day insecurity we, individually
and collectively, decided that it was time to attempt to build, in some small measure, a
future for ourselves in order to attempt to fufill the monetary and morale [sic] obligations
which we as 'individuals' have to ourselves and families." 130 U.S.P.Q. at 265.
22 The amounts recoverable were not computed in the trial court. 130 U.S.P.Q. at 269.

23 130 U.S.P.Q. at 267.
24
E.g., Central Ry. Signal Co. v. Longden, 194 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1952); Ramey v.
Myers, 159 Cal. App. 2d 82, 323 P.2d 805 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Bank of California v.
Hoffmann, 255 Wis. 165, 38 N.W.2d 506 (1949); Faultersack v. Clintonville Sales Corp.,
253 Wis. 432, 34 N.W.2d 682 (1948); see 2 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), AGENCY §§ 381, 390,
392 (1957); 1 MECHEM, Op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 1207, 1353; TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 4,
§ 146(c).
RpsTATEmENT § 381 abrogates the requirement of notice when there is a superior duty to
a third person not to disclose such information. It is doubtful that the duty to self and
family, see note 21 supra, comes within the ambit of this exception. See generally com-

ment (e).
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the termination of the employment, not to use special or confidential matter
or knowledge, acquired in the course of the employment, to the detriment
of his employer. 25 Since, however, the employee has rights which cannot be
sacrificed to the interests of the employer, 26 the courts must limit what knowledge they will include within the scope of the combined rules.
In Standard Brands, the court held, in effect, that because of the mental
state of the defendants while they were entertaining Standard Brand's customers, the rule requiring disclosure of pertinent information to one's employer applied. Hence their failure to disclose their competitive plans and their
personal appropriation of plaintiff's promotional activities constituted wrongful behavior. 27 In granting an accounting for profits and general damages as
25 E.g., Gutleber v. Hahl, 2W N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Patterson v. Pollock, 84
Ohio App. 489, 84 N.E.2d 606 (1948); see 2 RESTATEm-Nr (SEco.D), AGEN'y § 396(b)
(1957); MECHEM, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 1209-14; Annot., 165 A.L.R. 1453 (1946). B&isee
cases cited in note 54 infra.
2

6 See notes 54-56 infra and accompanying text.

Since good will is one of the employer's assets, it is not unusual for the courts to protect it. See CALLMA., op. cit. supra note 5, § 2.2; see generally Note, An Inquiry Into the
27

Nature of Good Will, 53 COLUM. L. Rav. 660, 666-68, 677-79 (1953). This is particularly so
when the development of the good will has been at considerable expense to the entrepreneur.
The courts have been willing to protect a firm's customer lists from misuse by a former
employee on the assumption that they constituted a vital segment of the business' good will.
As uas said in California Intelligence Bureau v. Cunningham, 83 Cal. App. 2d 197, 203,
188 P.2d 303, 306-07 (1948): "A list of subscribers of a service built up by ingenuity, time,
labor and expense of the owner... is [the] property of the employer, a part of the good will
of his business and, in some instances, his entire business. Knowledge of such a list... may
not be used by the employee as his own property or to his employer's prejudice. It is this
wrongful use by the former employee which constitutes an injury to the employer which
equity will restrain."
The list protected in Cunningham was a list of fund raising organizations compiled by a
firm specializing in the investigation of such organizations. The defendant, a former employee of the Bureau who had set up a similar service, was enjoined from using the special
techniques, information and lists purloined from his former employer. If judicial relief will
be granted to an employer under the facts alleged in this case, it is not a major step to
protect Standard Brands' financial investment in its promotional activities. Moreover, being
high-level employees,a higher degree of fiduciary duty is owed by the defendants in Standard
Brands than by an employee in a customer list case. It is academic to distinguish between
the costs of investigation in Cunningham and the costs of gifts and entertainment in Standard
Brands, where the overall effect is to create the good will necessary for the continuation
of the business. It is the behavior of the former employees as it affected the good will, not
the substantive difference in good will, %%hich is the concern of this comment. For a discussion of the position of Cunningham in the California law of unfair competition see Hays,
supra note 14.
For other case- in '.hich such lists have been protected because of their developmental
costs, see, e.g.. To.n & Country House & Home Service, Inc. v. Newberry, 3 N.Y.2d 554,
147 N.E.2d 724, 170 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1958); Halpern v. Berstein, 138 N.Y.S.2d 433 (Sup.
Ct. 1955); Witkop & Holmes Co. v. Boyce, 61 Misc. 126, 112 N.Y. Supp. 874 (Sup. Ct.
1908): Morgan's Home Equip. Co. v. Martucci, 390 Pa. 618, 136 A.2d 838 (1957). Bat see
Avocado Sales Co. v. \Wse, 122 Cal. App. 327, 10 P.2d 485 (1932); Eisenstaedt v. Schweitzer, 13 Misc. 2d 703, 177 N.Y.S.2d 277 (Sup. Ct. 1960). See also Corica v. Ragen, 140 F.2d
496 (7th Cir. 1944); Superior Oil v. Renfroe, 67 F. Supp. 277 (W.D. Okla. 1946); Arkansas
Dailies v. Dan, 36 Tenn. App. 663, 260 S.W.2d 200 (1953); ELS, TRm)n SECRETS §§ 14, 74
(1953).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

344

[VoL 29:339

well as an injunction against the use of the duplicated machinery, it might
well be that the court has created too broad a doctrine in this decision. A
rigorous application of the broad holding of StandardBrands will necessarily
curtail an employee from developing competitive plans beyond the embryonic
stage, at least while he is still in a fiduciary capacity. This will be particularly
true in such businesses as advertising agencies, insurance agencies and law
firms, where there is a highly developed personal relationship between a
representative of the corporation or partnership and the firm's clients. Certainly the opportunities for an employee to ingratiate himself with a cient
at the firm's expense, would be more prevalent in these areas than was the
case in StandardBrands. While the quality of the "product" of these service
industries is usually the most important factor, it can be said that to a large
extent these professions are predicated on the personal charms of the em28
ployees.
However, even in its broadest sense, the doctrine of StandardBrands would
not impose liability on an employee who terminated his employment as soon
as his competitive plans were conceived. The gestation period for the plans
would then occur when he was no longer under a fiduciary duty. This seemingly attractive alternative to enterprise killing liability is less impressive, however, when it is realized that only a few people have the liquid financial assets
necessary to survive the gestation period without income from wages. Another
factor involved here is that an employee would probably prefer his old job to
nothing, if, for some reason, there is a miscarriage of his competitive
29
schemes.
There are three possible categories of behavior which can be complained of
in this area. At one extreme are the cases where the employer is complaining
that the employee has been "disloyal" in becoming a competitor of his former
employer. It is doubtful that relief willibe granted in such a case because of a
sub rosa realization by the courts that most businesses must get their start by
just such a breaking away. 30 At the other extreme are the cases where the highlevel employee has stolen a trade secret of his former employer. Judicial relief
will definitely be granted under these circumstances. It is the area between
these two extremes where the problems arise. If the employee terminates the
employment relationship as soon as his plans are conceived, the case clearly
falls within the first category. If he decides to stay on, however, the question
the courts must decide is whether or not he has exploited the resources of his
2

See LArry, op. cit. supra note 4 at 402 n.6. In discussing the difficulty of proving that

a partner of a law firm has deliberately lined up his clients in order to take them with him
when he departed from the firm, the author makes the point thaf because of the personal

element it is questionable whose clients they actually are.
29 See generally Comment, Permissible Employee Disloyalty and the Duane Jones Case,
22 U. Cm. L. REv. 278, 287 (1954).
30
Consider, for example, the formation of most law firms and advertising agencies. See
note 28 supra.
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employer while preparing for the competitive enterprise. The conduct of the
defendants in Standard Brands in regard to the good will and use of the
plaintiff's staff can be considered to be within the category of such an exploitation of resources. Of course in this case the conduct also merged with the
second category since the defendants did copy the blueprints of the
machinery.
An analysis of the potential impact of StandardBrands is simplified by viewing it in the light of the earlier DuaneJones decision. In this case, the plaintiff
was awarded damages for the loss of customers and personnel, sustained as a
result of a conspiracy by several of the individual defendants to form a competing advertising agency. This conspiracy was formulated while the defendants were still in the employ of the plaintiff. The defendants had become dissatisfied with the conditions at the plaintiff agency because of certain "behavior lapses" on the part of its president, Duane Jones. 31 The defendants' concern over the business reverses of the plaintiff prompted them to formulate
plans for a new agency. This, however, was only an alternative to buying out
Jones' interest in the firm. Jones was forewarned of the alternative plan of the
defendants when they attempted to negotiate the purchase. It appeared that
Jones was also aware that the defendants had already discussed their inchoate
plans with several of the firm's clients, and that these clients had reacted
favorably. At the trial, however, there was testimony by Jones to the effect
that he had no knowledge that several of the agency's key personnel and clients had been invited to join the new agency, which. the defendants had
formed subsequent to the failure of the negotiations, but prior to their resignanation. 32 The court held that the conduct of the defendants "as officers, directors or employees of the plaintiff corporation '... fell below the standard
required by the law of one acting as an agent or employee of another."' 33
31 Thes lales occurred -at his office at business fimctions, and at interviews with actual
and prospective customers." 306 N.Y. at 180-81, 117 N.E.2d at 241. While it is not clear
from the opinion, it appeam that the "lapses" were due to akohoL As a resolt of Jo ' co -

duct in the six montmhs prior to the mas resignation of the individual dendanm the agency

had lost three major accomts and had received re
atk from certain of its exeatiw
and staff membes See veneally Comment, Tafioi
f the Fariy
Duty ofBa&suen
Associates ot to Con etfor the Fr'nsCutomer andSqpliers,4 DuxE L.J 16,19 (1954);
Comment, Permissil Evzloyee Disloyalty and the Duw Joren Case, 22 U. Cm. L R-v.
278, 279 (1954). For the situation in StandardBrands see note 21 ipra.
32 The credibility of this testimony might well be doubted since it seems reasonable that
solicitation would be ancillary to the preselling, of whixich Jones was aware. In fact, it is
questionable if these two term have any meaning independent of each other at all
In StandardBrandsit was not cear if the defendants had done any direct solicitation of

customer patronage during their entertain
the re.ipients as indirect solicitation.

or if they were relying on the gratitud of

!3 306 N.Y. at 187, 117 N.E.2d at 244, quoting from Lamdin v. Broadway Surface Adv.

Corp., 272 N.Y. 133, 138, 5 N.E.2d 66, 67 (1936).
There was no explicit mention that the relief granted to the plaintiff was predicated on
the expense to Duane Jones of the firm's development. See general- note 27 Wpra. However,
it would seem logical that there must be some correlation between his effcorts, as guiding
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Both StandardBrands and Duane Jones34 provide considerable protection
to an employer's business interest, by limiting what competitive plans can be
made by a high-level employee without his being held liable for unfair competition. In StandardBrands the defendants were held liable because they had
not informed their employer of their competitive plans, 3 5 while in Duane
Jones the defendants were held liable even though they had informed their
employer of their general competitive plans. 36 Looking at the two cases to.gether, then, it would seem that the lack of notice is not as important a factor
in the determination of liability as the court in StandardBrands considered it
to be. Notice was insufficient to prevent liability of the defendants in Duane
Jones, and it is doubtful whether mere notice of general competitive plans in
StandardBrandswould have been sufficient to immunize the defendants from
liability. It would also seem unlikely that notice of the copying of the blueprints would have discharged the liability, because the plaintiff could take
little solace from such knowledge without the practical relief of an injunction
against their use. Only in the rare case where notice might enable the employer
to ful!y protect himself on his own, can notice be said to insulate the employee
from liability. In StandardBrands, notice of the competitive plans might only
37
have removed the need for the damage aspect of the relief.
spirit of the firm, and its gross advertising billings. If this was the case, the expense might
well have been a sub rosa factor in the court's holding of liability.
Because of its equitable nature the cause of action for the wrongful diversion of good
will was severed from the case as it was presented to the court of appeals. This difference
from the StandardBrands case does not affect its usefulness in interpreting the present state
of the law for two reasons. One, it is clear that such a cause of action here would also have
been decided adversely to the defendants. Secondly, the conduct of the defendants and not
the form of the litigation is important for the purposes of this comment's analysis. See note
68 infra.
34 For discussions of Duane Jones, see generally Comment, Permissible Employee Disloyalty and the Duane Jones Case, 22 U. Cm. L. REV. 278 (1954); Comment. Termination
of the Fiduciary Duty of Business Associates Not to Compete for the Firm's Customers and
Suppliers, 4 DUKE L.J. 16 (1954); Note, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 994 (1954); Comment, 39 IowA

L. REV. 185 (1953); Note 38 MiNr. L. REV. 661 (1954). For the impact of the decision on
the advertising industry, see generally, Advertising Age, Jan. 11, 1954 pp. 1, !A, 75, 79, 82.
35 See text :ccompanying note 23 supra. There is, of course, the possibility that notice
might have had no effect on Standard Brands' promotional activities. The corporation
might well have decided that the cancellation of the policy which they had followed for
several years would have been more harmful to its good will than the conspiracy of the
defendants. There is also the possibility that the defendants' letters of explanation, see
note 21 supra, might have had as much effect on American's business as did the continuance
of the entertainment. The couri might very well have placed too much stress on the particular conduct of the defendants, while overlooking other ways in which the same end
might have been achieved.
36 It is clear that Duane Jones was aware of the defendants' alternative plan. Since Jones
would have to be particularly obtuse in not realizing that there was customer solicitation, it
can be argued either that he had such notice, see note 32 supra, or that there was implied
notice. See generally Comment, PermissibleEmployee Disloyalty and the Duane Jones Case,
22 U. Cm. L. REv. 278, 284-85 (1954).
37 But see note 35 supra.
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It seems that some "plus" factor will be required before an employee will
be held liable for unfairly competing with his former employer. 3 The two
cases are consistent if the criteria for liability is said to be a "plus" factor of
reprehensible behavior. In Standard Brands such a factor would seem to be
either the attempt to usurp the plaintiff's good will, the copying of the blueprints for the machinery necessary for the production of the partitions, or the
use of the plaintiff's staff by the defendants for their personal benefit.39 In
Duane Jones the "plus" factor would seem to be the attempt to coerce Jones
into selling his interest in the business, the solicitation of customer patronage
prior to the termination of the employment, 40 the agency's lack of "equal
opportunity" to compete with its former employees, 41 or the degree of the
42
defendants' appropriation of "corporate opportunities."
The need for a "plus" factor does not preclude the possible importance of
notice in some circumstances. It is not impossible that in a particular factual
context, none of the various acts of an employee preparing for competition
individually come within the ambit of reprehensible behavior, but that collectively they do. If it is necessary to look at the sum of the employee's acts,it is
43
possible that lack of notice might "shift the balance" against the employee.
The need for a "plus" factor of reprehensible behavior seems to support the
38 See 2 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENCY 393 (1957) where, without mentioning a requirement of notice, it is stated that an employee can make certain preparations for competing with his employer prior to the termination of his employment. It would seem
that the writers of the Restatement realize that such a requirement would be too onerous a
burden on an employee seeking to better himself. See generally note 54 infra and accompanying text. See also, Town & Country House & Home Service, Inc. v. Newberry, 3
N.Y.2d 554, 562, 147 N.E.2d 724, 728, 170 N.Y.S.2d 328, 334 (1958).
3
9 See text accompanying note 21 supra.
40 See text accompanying note 32 supra.
41 See generally Comment, Termination of the FiduciaryDuty of Dusiness Associates Not
to Compete for the Firm's Costumers and Suppliers, 4 DUKE L.J. 16 (1954).
42

See generally Comment, Permissible Employee Disloyalty and the DuaneJones Case,
22 U. CHI. L. REV. 278, 285-86 (1954).
43 For other cases where the degree of reprehensibility of the former employee's behavior,
in regard to competitive preparations, appears to be a factor in the determination of whether
or not there was liability, see, e.g., Midland-Ross Corp. v. Yokana, 185 F. Supp. 594
(D.N.J. 1960) (appropriation of blueprints, customer lists and cost calculations of a plastic
extruding firm); Frank v. Wiltscheck, 115 F. Supp. 28 (S.D.N.Y.), afi'd, 209 F.2d 493
(2d Cir. 1953) (appropriation of service station franchise); Red Top Cab Co. v. Hanchett,
42 F.2d 236 (N.D. Cal. 1931) (use of equipment and facilities for competitive business);
Ritterpusch v. Lithographic Plate Service, Inc., 208 Md. 592, 119 A.2d 392 (1956) (solicitation of customers of employer); United Board & Carton Corp. v. Britting, 63 N.J. Super
517, 164 A.2d 824 (Ch. 1959), aff'd, 61 N.J. Super. 340, 160 A.2d 600 (App. Div. 1960)
(solicitation of customers and use of confidential price lists). See also National Welding
Equip. Co. v. Hammon Precision Equip. Co., 165 F.Supp. 788 (N.D. Cal. 1958) (use of
knowledge of employer's pressure regulator); Mathews Paint Co. v. Seaside Paint &
Lacquer Co., 148 Cal. App. 2d 168, 306 P.2d 113 (1957) (solicitation of customers); State
Export Co. v. Mol. Shipping and Trading, Inc., 155 N.Y.S.2d 188 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (appropriation of bicycle franchise).
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thesis that a high-level employee will be held to a lower standard of behavior
than a director or a business partner. 44 In cases involving individuals within
the highest fiduciary level, the courts have shown less concern with the actual
damage to the principal than in proof of a betrayal of the trust imposed. As was
said in Guth v. Loft:
The rule [of liability], inveterate and uncompromising in its rigidity, does
not rest upon the narrow ground of injury or damage to the corporation
reulting from a betrayal of confidence, but upon a broader foundation
of a wise public policy that, for the purpose of removing all temptation,
esziguisbes all possibility of profit flowing from a breach of the confidence

iMWOsed by the fiduciary re~afions

45

In cases involving high-level employees, even if couched in terms of a breach
of the fiduciary duty, there is more concern with the injury suffered by the
principal as a result of the conduct of the employees. This is true even if the
employees are also directors, as was the case in DuaneJones, if the litigation
is in the context of their role as employees rather than directors. In effect the
high-level employee will not be held to a "punctilio of an honor the most

sensitive.""
However, the high-level employee has a greater duty than a low-level employee. This is manifested by the fact that the courts predicate the protection
of an item such as a customer list used by a salesman only upon whether or
not it is a trade secret, 4 7 confidential information 4
pkm. 4 9 The courts seem to fed that

or "property" of the em-

the conduct which the former employer
Is attempting to impeach must fall within one of the labeled areas before employee liability for unfair competition will be reasonable.O This concern for
4
See Guth v. Loft, 23 DeL Ch 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939); Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y.
4,A64 N.E. 545 (928).
* 23 DeL Ch. at 270, 5 A.2d at 510.

4 MCinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. at 464, 164 N.E. at 546.
47

E.g., Bourns v. Edcliff Instrumits, 125 F.Supp. 503 (S.D. Cal. 1954); California
Intefligence Bureau v. Cunningham, 83 Cal. App. 2d 197, 188 P.2d 303 (1948); Avocado
Saks Co. v. Wyse, 122 Cal. 344, 10 P.2d 485 (1932); Dairy Dale Co. v. Azevedo, 211 Cal.
344,295 Pac. 10 (1931); National Tile Board Corp. v. Panelboard Mfg. Co., 27 NJ. Super.
348, 99 A.2d 440 (Ch. 1953); Town & Country House & Home Service Inc. v. Newberry,
3 N.Y.2d 554, 147 N.E.2d 724, 170 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1958); Boosing v. Dorman, 148 App.
Div. 824, 133 N.Y.Supp. 910 (1912), aff'd mem., 210 N.Y. 529, 103 N.E. 1121 (1913).
48 Eg., Clonial Laundries Inc. v. Henry, 48 R.I. 332, 138 Ad. 47 (1927); see also
Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953); cf. Adolph Gottscho Inc. v. American
Marking Corp., 35 NJ. Super. 333, 114 A.2d 19 (Ch. 1954), aff'd, 18 NJ. 467, 114 A.2d 438
(1955).

4 Eg., Abalene Exterminating Co. v. Oser, 125 NJ. Eq. 329, 5 A.2d 738 (Ch. 1939);
Morricm v. Woodbury, 105 Kan; 617, 185 Pac. 735 (1919).
5o A term of art such as "trade secret" cannot readily be used as a test in the determination of liability because the particular term applies to a situation only when a court says
that it does. Hence, various tests have been created to implement these terms, and in the
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labels does not appear to be found in the high-level employee cases. All that
is there needed is a "plus" factor, whether or not the act involved falls within
a particular Category.
What the courts really appear to be doing in the high-level cases is to look
at each case on an ad hoc basis in an attempt to ascertain whether or not there
development of these tests the courts appear to show concern for reasonableness of behavior
in employer-employee relationships, even when the former employee had not been high in
the corporate hierarchy.
In the customer list cases (see cases cited in notes 47-49 supra) this is often manifested
by the court's concern over whether or not the list was written; e.g., Aetna Bldg. Maintenance Co. v. West, 39 Cal. 2d 198, 246 P.2d 11 (1952); Morrison v. Woodbury, 105 Kan.
617, 185 Pac. 735 (1919); Baton Rouge Cigarette Service v. Bloomenstiel, 88 So. 2d 742
(La. App. 1956); cf.Patterson v. Pollock, 84 Ohio App. 489 84 N.E.2d 606 (1948); Addante
v. Cinelli, 143 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct. 1955); contra, Alex Foods v. Metcalf, 137 Cal. App. 2d
415, 290 P.2d 648 (1956); George v. Burdusis, 21 Cal. 2d 153, 130 P.2d 399 (1942); seu 2
REsTATEmENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 396(b) (1957); over whether or not a competitor could
ascertain the names on the list without difficulty by mere perusal of a trade directory as a
guide; e.g., Alex Foods v. Metcalfe, 137 Cal..App. 2d 415, 290 P.2d 646 (1955); California
Intelligence Bureau v. Cunningham, 83 Cal. App. 2d 197, 188 P.2d 303 (1948); Avocado
Sales Co. v. Wyse, 122 Cal. App. 627, 10 P.2d 485 (1932); National Tile Board Corp. v.
Panelboard Mfg. Co., 27 NJ. Super 348, 99 A.2d 440 (App. Div. 1953); Abalene Exterminating Co. v. Oser, 125 N.J. Eq. 329, 5 A.2d 738 (Ch. 1939); People's Coat, Apron &
Towel Service Co. v. Light, 171 App. Div. 671, 157 N.Y. Supp. 15, aff'd as modified, 224
N.Y. 727, 121 N.E. 886 (1918); over whether or not the employee had learned of any special
requirements of the customers during his employment; e.g., Delux Box Lunch & Catering
Service v. Black, 86 Cal. App. 2d 434, 194 P.2d 715 (1948) (concurring opinion); Dairy Dale
Co. v. Azevedo, 211 Cal. 344, 295 Pac. 10 (1931); or over whether or not the list had been
compiled at great expense or effort on the part of the employer; e.g., California Intelligence
Bureau v. Cunningham, 83 Cal. App. 2d 197, 188 P.2d 303 (1948); Town & Country House
& Home Service, Inc. v. Newberry, 3 N.Y.2d 554, 147 N.E.2d 724, 170 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1958).
It might seem that these distinctions are examples of judicial hairsplitting. Yet they are
necessary if there is to be a proper balancing of the various interests. If a businessman has
gone to great expense to develop a list of customers, where the names of the customers and
their desires are not readily ascertainable, it is unreasonable for one of his employees to
purloin such a list to his detriment; conversely, it is not unreasonable for the entrepreneur
to seek legal sanctions against such an act. If, however, the contents of such a list can easily
be ascertained by anyone possessing normal perception, an employee should be able to
solicit the patronage of the customers of his former employer with impunity. To be consistent, this rule should not apply even where the expense of development of the list was great,
if it was needless. To hold otherwise would deny the proposition that an employer has "no
vested and indefeasible right to monopolize customers." Corica v. Ragen, 140 F.2d 496,
498 (7th Cir. 1944). See note 54 infra and accompanying text.
Similarly, the courts' concern for reasonableness is manifested by their allowing an
employee to discuss business with a customer of his former employer, on his invitation,
and even to accept proffered patronage, where he would not be allowed to solicit such
patronage. E.g., Aetna Bldg. Maintenance Co. v. West, 39.Cal. 2d 198, 204, 246 P.2d 11, 15
(1952). The courts are willing to distinguish between acceptance and solicitation in order
to achieve their goal of fairness to all parties.
The judicial handling of cases involving trade secrets also supports the assertion that the
courts are in effect concerned with the reasonableness ofquestioned conduct. E.g., Kelite Corp.
v. Khem Chemicals, 162 F.Supp. 332 (N.D. Ill. 1958) (chemical formulas); National Welding
Equip. v. Hammon Precision Equip. Co., 165 F.Supp. 788 (N.D. Cal. 1958) (pressure regulators); Carter Prod. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 130 F. Supp. 557 (D. Md. 1955), aff'd,
169 F.2d 275 (4th Cir), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 843 (1956) (shaving cream formula); Julius
(Footnote 50 continued on p. 350)
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is need for judicial interference "to promote honest and fair dealing... [and
to] protect not rights of the public but the rights and property of individuals."51
In effect the courts are looking at the reasonableness of the employee's behavior vis-i-vis the relationship with his former employer. The converse of
this is also trie, i.e., that the relief sought by the former employer must be
(Footnote 50 continued from p. 349]
Hyman &Co. v. Velsicol Corp., 123 Colo. 563, 233 P.2d 977 (1951) (insecticide formula.);
Junker v. Plummer, 320 Mass. 76, 67 N.E.2d 667 (1946) (shoe upper combining process);
Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v. American Marking Corp., 35 N.J. Super. 333, 114 A.2d 19 (Ch.
1954), aff'd, 18 NJ. 467, 114 A.2d 438 (1955) (package marking process); Sun Dial Corp.
v. Rideout, 25 NJ. Super. 591, 96 A.2d 788 (Ch. 1953), rev'd, 29 N.J. Super. 361, 102 A.2d
90, af'd, 16 NJ. 252, 108 A.2d 442 (1954) (photographic process for marking precision
dials); Boost Co. v. Faunce, 13 NJ. Super. 63, 80 A.2d 246 (Ch. 1951), aff'd, 17 N.J. Super.
458, 86 A.2d 283 (App. Div. 1952) (soft drink formula); Black v. Berstein, 152 N.Y.S.2d
655 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (optically compensated lens system); Perfect Measuring Tape Co. v.
Notheis, 93 Ohio App. 507, 114 N.E.2d 149 (1953) (tape manufacturing process); Welex
Jet Service, Inc. v. Owen, 325 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1959) (oil well drilling process);
cf. Sasser v. Senco Products, Inc., 242 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1957). An example of this is the
rule thai an item, be it a formula or process of production, will not be protected as a trade
secret if it is generally known by the industry. See, e.g., Junker v. Plummer, 320 Mass. 76,
67 N.E.2d 667 (1946). However, this does not mean that "absolute secrecy [of the process]
is... required ... ." It is sufficient if there is a qualified secrecy vis-A.-vis the industry. Sun
Dial Corp. v. Rideout, 29 N.J. Super 361, 368, 102 A.2d 90, 94 (App. Div. 1954). See also
Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 72 N.J. Eq. 387, 67 At. 339 (E. & A. 1907);
Richard M. Krause, Inc. v. Gardner, 99 N.Y.S.2d 592 (Sup. Ct. 1950); ELLs, TRAE SECRTS
§§ 20, 22 (1953). This limitation reveals an implicit preoccupation with reasonableness. If
it were not for such a limitation an employer could claim that any formula or process was a
trade secret and hence deserving of judicial protection. If this were allowed, it would, in
effect, preclude any of his employees from seeking other jobs within the industry. See, e.g.,
Bourns v. Edcliff Instruments, 125 F. Supp. 503, 508 (S.D. Cal. 1954). Similarly, the courts
have denied injunctive relief where an employer is attempting to prevent a former employee
from using the "general" skills and knowledge necessarily acquired in the course of employment. See, e.g., Safeway Stores v. Wilcox, 220 F.2d 661, 665 (10th Cir. 1955); Progressive
Eng'r, Inc. v. Machinecraft, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 291, 298 (D. Mass. 1959); National Welding
Equip. v. Hammon Precision Equip. Co., 165 F. Supp. 788, 796 (N.D. Cal. 1958); cf.Town
& Country House & Home Service, Inc. v. Newberry, 3 N.Y.2d 554,147 N.E.2d 724,170
N.Y.S.2d 328 (1958); but see Carter Prods. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 130 F. Supp. 557,
578-79 (D. Md. 1955), aff'd, 169 F.2d 275 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 843 (1956). A
particularly vivid example of the limits placed on a businessman seeking protection of a
process is where the process was discovered fairly, i.e., by independent research. In such a
case, the courts have refused to grant the plaintiff his injunction. See Boost Co. v. Faunce,
13 N.J. Super, 63. 86 A.2d 246 (Ch. 1951), aff'd, 17 N.J. Super. 458, 86 A.2d 283 (App. Div.
1952); see also ELLis, supra, §§ 18, 24; cf. Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430
(1960). When the.item possesses the requisite qualities of patentability, however, the courts
find it reasonable to impose sanctions in favor of the holder of the patent. See generally
ELLIs, supra, §§ 139-64.
The same judicial tendency is manifested in cases concerning restrictive covenants, both
those not to compete after the termination of the employment, e.g., Morris v. Harris, 127
Cal. App. 2d 476,274 P.2d 22 (1954); Harry Livingston, Inc. v. Macher, 30 Del. Ch. 94,54 A.
2d 169 (Ch. 1947); Donahue v. Permacel Tape Corp., 234 Ind. 398, 127 N.E.2d 235 (1955);
Baton Rouge Cigarette Serv. v. Bloomensteil, 88 So. 2d 742 (La. App. 1956); Abalene Ex[Footnote 50 continued on p. 351
51CALLMANN, op. cit. supra note 15, § 3 at 27.
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reasonable. If this is not done, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to have
a proper balancing of the equities between the rights of the employer on the
one hand and the employee on the other.52 An unreasonable act by either
party to the employment relationship results in a corresponding abrogation
of the other party's rights. It ought to be pointed out that, as far as the employee
is concerned, the question of reasonableness arises in the context of a fiduciary
relationship, rather than in the context of an ordinary business relationship;
where the participants are dealing at "arm's length."
Essentially, the question is how much latitude of conduct will be allowed
an employee if he decides to compete with his former employer. Two conflicting public policies are apparent. On the one hand there is the deeply
imbedded tradition that favors the protection of a person's property interest
in his business from unfair competition. What a person has labored for should
be protected from wrongs by others.53 On the other hand there is the equally
strong, if not stronger policy which favors free competition in the economic
sphere of our society. As a corollary a person has the right to improve his
socio-economic status, even if the resulting effect is somewhat detrimental to
the business interest of his former employer. 54 It is necessary that there be a
[Footnote 50 continued from p. 350]
terminating Co. v. Oser, 125 NJ. Eq. 329, 5 A.2d 738 (Ch. 1939); National Starch Prods.,
Inc. v. Polymer Indus., Inc., 79 N.Y.S.2d 357 (App. Div. 1948); Arthur Murray Dance
Studio v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio C.P. 1952); Briggs v. Butler, 140 Ohio St. 499, 45
N.E.2d 757 (1942); Morgan's Home Equip. Co. v. Martucci, 390 Pa. 618, 136 A.2d 838
(1957); Arkansas Dailies v. Dan, 36 Tenn. App. 663, 260 S.W.2d 200 (1953); see generally
Carpenter, Validity of ContractsNot to Compete, 76 U. PA. L. REv. 224 (1928); Note, Protection of Customer Lists in New York, 1 SmRAcusE L. REv. 110 (1949); and those not to disclose or divulge trade secrets. See, e.g., Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166
F. Supp. 250 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Donahue v. Permacel Tape Corp., 234 Ind.398, 127 N.E.2d
235 (1955). The thrust of these decisions seems to be that while a person can contract away
his competitive rights, he cannot contract himself into a state of economic servitude by
subjecting himself to restrictions unreasonable as to time or place. See Harry Livingston,
Inc. v. Macher, 30 Del. Ch. 94, 54 A.2d 169, 173 (Ch. 1947); see generally Arthur Murray
Dance Studio v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio C.P. 1952) and cases therein cited.
In deciding if a restrictive covenant should be enforced, the courts have uniformly held
that the burden of proof is on the party seeking relief to show that he will suffer irreparable
injury if the injunction is not granted. For an excellent survey of the authorities on this
matter, see Arthur Murray Dance Studio v. Witter, supra at 691-712. This requirement is
analogous to the employer's burden of proving secrecy in the trade secret cases. Inherent
in this requirement seems to be a judicial awareness that an employer does have superior
bargaining power compared with an employee, and that if this power is left unchecked it
might be abused to the employee's detriment. See note 54 infra and accompanying text.
52 See note 55 infra.
53

See Euais, op. cit. supra note 50, § 1; see generally id., §§ 1-2, 4-14 and cases cited
therein.
54 "[A] former employee should not be restrained from competing with a former employer
even though it may result in some injury to his former employer.. . ." Addante v. Cinelli,
143 N.Y.S.2d 244,247 (Sup. Ct. 1955). See, e.g., Continental Car-Na-Var Corp. v. Moseley,
24 Cal. 2d 104, 148 P.2d 9 (1944) (district manager of "wax" firm could solicit patronage of
customers of former employer).

352

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 29:339

balancing of the equities between these two rights,s- for if the former is carried
to its extreme it will deprive a man of his right to earn a living;56 while conversely. the latter right, if unchecked, would probably make a mockery of the
fiduciary concept, with its concomitants of loyalty and fair play.
Within the context of this balancing of equities it is arguable that the courts
should consider the prior acts of the employer as a possible justification for
the conduct of the employee.S7 These acts might either justify the employee's
conduct or at least mitigate the degree of relief granted. In this way it is not
necessary to say the employee is right or wrong. The dilemma of such an
either-or proposition is softened by the flexibility of the remedy. This flexibility permits a remedy befitting the actual wrong suffered by the employer, even
if his treatment of the employee cannot be impeached. 58 Since it is clear that
the courts will not protect an employer if the employee has merely become
another competitor,5 9 they should, if the employee has acted reprehensibly,
protect the employer only as long as the competitive advantage lesulting from
the employee's behavior exists.
In analyzing the "plus" factors of Standard Brands, using the reasonableness criteria, it is necessary to look at the situation as it existed at the time of
the initial formulation of the plans. It must be remembered that for the most
part, StandardBrands is within the area between the extremes of clear liability
and clear immunity from liability. 60 The defendants claimed that Standard
Brands had never shown any concern for their personal welfare or future. 61
Their choice of means to rectify this situation would appear to be unreasonable, however. There was nothing to prevent them from taking the initiative
and demonstrating to Standard Brands the legitimateness of their complaints. If the plaintiff had been approached on the matter, but had still shown
no interest, then the competitive plans would have been much more reasonable. Even if it is assumed that the preparations were generally reasonable,the
copying of the blueprints of the necessary machinery was not. Such behavior
5SSee, e.g., Continental Car-Na-Var v. Moseley, supra note 54, at 110, 148 P.2d at 12-13.
See also ELLIS, op. cit. supra note 50, § 11. See generally, Carpenter, Validity of Contracts
Not to Compete, 76 U. PA. L. REv. 244, 253-56 (1928); McClain, Injunctive Relief Against
Employees Using Confidential Information, 23 Ky. L.J. 248, 255 (1935); Note, Equitable
Protectionof Trade Secrets, 23 COLuM. L. REv. 164,166 (1923); Note, Protectionof Customer
Lists in New York, I SYRAcusE L. REv. 110 (1949).
56See Simons v. Fried, 302 N.Y. 323, 324-25, 98 N.E.2d 453, 456 (1951).
57
Such possible justification is seen in the treatment of the defendant employees in
StandardBrands and in the behavioral lapses of the president in Duane Jones. See notes 21
and 31 supra and accompanying text.
58 For a particularly cogent discussion of the need for reasonable relief, see the dissenting
opinion by Frank, J., in Franke v. Wiltscheck, 115 F.2d 493, 500 (2d Cir. 1953).

59 See notes 28, 30 supra and accompanying text.
text supra at pp. 344-45.

60 See

61 See note 21 supra.
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should not be condoned as reasonable even where there is no employment
63
relationship involved.6 2 It would seem that the plaintiff's requested relief
was reasonable in view of the disastrous effect of the defendant's acts on its
business.64
The defendants' conduct in Duane Jones was also unreasonable, although
not as clearly so. The concern of the defendants, here, was even more legitimate than in StandardBrands,65 because their present means of livelihood was
threatened by Jones' behavior. For the most part, their conduct was not
unconscionable in that they did first attempt to purchase Jones' interest in
the agency. As in Standard Brands, the reasonable end did not justify the
means used. Here the defendants attempted to bargain with Jones with a
"gun at his head."6 6 Moreover, they solicited their accounts' patronage prior
to the termination of their employment. The request for damages was reasonable in that. for all intents and purposes, the defendants had destroyed the
agency's business. 67 Since the verdict of $300,000 was based on the proposed
purchase price of the firm, it would also seem proper. 68
62 See Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369.(7th Cir. 1953). In this case, the defendant
was enjoined from competing with the plaintiff in the freight container business until the
latter had become re-established in the industry. The defendant, by professing an interest
in the purchase of plaintiff's business, had acquired (1) knowledge of his secret designs and
plans for freight containers, and (2) lists of present and prospective customers. This information enabled the defendant to produce a similar container at lower cost, to the detriment
of plaintiff's business. Even though the parties were dealing at arm's length, and even
though the defendant could have acquired the desired information in a legitimate manner
-- e.g., by examining an existent container-the court held that in this particular instance
the information had been divulged in confidence, and hence that the defendant could be
enjoined. See also Franke v. Wiltscheck, 115 F. Supp. 28 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 209 F.2d 493
(2d Cir. 1953).
63 See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
64 See note 21 supra.
65 See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
66 Consider, for example, the preselling of the alternative plan to the firm's clients. See
306 N.Y. at 181, 118 N.E.2d at 241. But see Comment, 4 DuKE B.J. 16 (1954).
6
7 Within six weeks of the formal opening of the defendant agency it had in its employ
seventy-one of the one hundred thirty-two persons formerly employed by Duane Jones Co.
and had appropriated S4,500,000 of its annual billings. 306 N.Y. at 184, 117 N.E.2d at 243.
68 But see Comment, 22 U. CHi. L. Ray. 278, 286 (1954).
There is an interesting ramification in the law of unfair competition which was accented
there. Because of the form of the action in Duane Jones, the case was tried before a jury.
See note 33 supra. An injunction against the defendants in Duane Jones would not furnish
the plaintiff agency with adequate relief. Since Duane Jones was practically out of business,
the defendant's clients would merely switch their business to other advertising firms in the
area. The plaintiff agency would not benefit thereby. Damages provided the only advantageous form of relief for Duane Jones. However, in the usual case the requested relief is an
injunction, the motion for which is heard by a judge sitting without a jury. As a consequence, judges are forced to delimit reasonable behavior in regard to competitive preparations. This can be contrasted to the field of torts where the delimitation of reasonable
behavior vis-i-vis negligence is considered to be within the special province of the jury.
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An obvious objection to this emphasis on "reasonable behavior" in the
employer-employee context is that it is a vague term, giving little or no guidance to an employee desirous of competing with his employer without incurring
liability for a breach of a fiduciary duty or for unfair competition. The best
advice which can be given an ambitious high-level employee, who is charting
a competitive course, is that he should bring all of life's experience to bear in
attempting to determine whether or not society will consider his proposed
conduct fair, while always remembering that he will be held to a higher standard than a person dealing at arm's length with an enterprise. Implicit here,
as in the reasonable man doctrine in torts, is the requirement that the test be
objective rather than subjective. In the words of Mr. Justice Cardozo, the
parties and the courts must realize that:
Here, indeed, as so often in other branches of the law, the decisive distinctions are those of degree and not of kind. One struggles in vain for any
verbal formula that will supply a ready touchstone. The standard set up
... is not a rule of law; it is rather a way of life. Life in all its fullness must
supply the answer to the riddle.69
If there is a fault in this position, it is not in the law, but rather it is in the
fallibility of man.
Probably the closest we can come to a "ready touchstone" is to advise an
employee to follow the Golden Rule, while always remembering that "[the]

subsequent transaction will be subjected to a vigorous examination to see that
the former agent did not abuse his position of trust and influence, or in any
way fail in his attitude as agent during the agency." 70
69 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1933).

7o Wight v. Brown, 77 Ga. App. 375, 378-79, 48 S.E.2d 784, 787 (1945).
It is not sufficient to say that decisions such as Standard Brands and Duane Jones are
caveats to an employee not to take short cuts in the effecting of his desires. Certainly such
decisions are caveats to employees, but the courts should be aware that a disgruntled employer may unjustifiably attempt to use them against the competition of his former highlevel employees.

